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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
ROOSEVELT CITY, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
DAVID KOLE WRIGHT, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Appellate Case No. 20090850 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The statutory authority that confers jurisdiction on the Court of Appeals to decide 
the appeal is Utah Code Arm. Section 78A-4-103(e). Judge A. Lynn Payne found David 
Kole Wright guilty of driving under the influence of alcohol and/or drugs on July 20, 
2009. Judge A. Lynn Payne sentenced him on September 14,2009. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. Was there sufficient evidence to sustain a conviction against the appellant for 
driving under the influence and/or drugs? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW. "When reviewing a bench trial for sufficiency of 
evidence, we must sustain the trial court's judgment unless it is against the clear weight of 
the evidence, or if the appellate court otherwise reaches a definite and firm conviction 
that a mistake has been made." Spanish Fork v. Bryan. 1999 UT App 61, ^ 5, 975 P.2d 
501 (citations omitted). However, 'before we can uphold a conviction it must be 
supported by a quantum of evidence concerning each element of the crime as charged 
from which the fact finder may base its conclusion of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.'" 
State v. Larsen. 999 P.2d 1252 (Ut. App 2000). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
Utah Code Ann. Section 41-6a-502, set forth in the Addendum, is relevant to a 
determination of this appeal. 
CITATION TO THE RECORD THAT THE ISSUE WAS PRESERVED 
IN THE TRIAL COURT 
"When findings of fact are made in actions tried by the court without a jury, the 
question of sufficiency of the evidence to support the findings may thereafter be raised 
whether or not the party raising the question has made in the district court an objection to 
such findings or made either a motion to amend them, a motion for judgment, or a motion 
for a new trial." State v. Larsen. 2000 UT App 106,19, 999 P.2d 1252. 
Further, David Cole Wright's counsel preserved the issue when he argued to the 
court. "I don't - -1 don't think there's enough to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that 
he'd taken medication to cause this condition. There's no evidence of what the 
medication was. R. 41: p. 30, lines 8-11. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
I. Nature of the Case and Course of Proceedings 
An information was filed against Wright on March 3, 2009. R.l. An arraignment 
was held on May 11, 2009. R.6. A bench trial was held on July 20, 2009. R.41. This 
appeal is taken from a bench trial conviction entered on July 20, 2009. R.30. 
II. Statement of the Facts 
On October 28, 2008, at approximately 7:00 a.m., officer Henry McKenna of the 
Roosevelt City Police Department received a call from the Western Hills Motel. R. 41: p. 
5, lines 1-7. When the officer arrived at the Western Hills Motel, he observed, a male, in 
the driver's seat, with a car running. R. 41: p. 7, lines 13-14. The driver at some point 
had a lit cigarette in his mouth and it had burned out and had ashes all over his chest. R. 
41: p. 7, lines 15-16. At some point the officer was able to get the drivers attention and 
the officer learned that the individuals name was David Kole Wright. R. 41: p. 7 & 8. 
When officer McKenna first arrived, Wright was slumped over in the driver's seat. 
R. 41: p. 8, line 20-21. Officer McKenna began pounding on the windows trying to wake 
the individual. R. 41: p. 9, lines 15-16. Officer McKenna testified that he spent about 15 
to 20 minutes trying to get Wright's attention. R. 41: p. 9, line 18. Officer McKenna then 
used a six foot rod that the police use to unlock locks on automatic vehicles. R. 41: p. 10, 
lines 13-15. Officer McKenna then used the rod to poke Wright until he woke up. R. 41: 
p. 10, lines 22-25. 
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When Wright woke up he was very disoriented and didn't know exactly where he 
was. R. 41: p. 11, lines 4-6. When Wright woke up he rolled down the window and 
officer McKenna asked him to exit the vehicle. R. 41: p. 11, lines 7-8. It took Wright 
another minute to exit the vehicle. R. 41: p. 11, line 8. 
When Wright exited the vehicle officer McKenna had to help him because Wright 
almost fell over. R. 41: p. 12, lines 11-13. Officer McKenna then physically helped 
Wright to the back of the car. R. 41: p. 12, lines 17-19. During officer McKenna's 
contact with Wright he did not smell the odor of alcohol. R. 41: p. 13, lines 6-7 and p. 22, 
linel8. 
Officer McKenna then went and talked to Wright's girlfriend. R. 41: p. 13, lines 
4-10. Officer McKenna then went back to talk to Wright. During this conversation, 
officer McKenna determined that Wright had taken some medication. R. 41: p. 14, line 2. 
There was no testimony regarding what kind of medication Wright might have taken. 
However, officer McKenna testified that most medication does not cause impairment. R. 
41: p. 22, lines 24-25. 
After Wright was detained for about 20 to 30 minutes, he was cited for driving on 
a suspended license and released. R. 41: p. 18, lines 2-3. There were no field sobriety 
tests nor any other physical tests performed on Mr. Wright. R. 41: p. 22, lines 11-15. Mr. 
Wright was allowed to leave without having his blood draw taken or a any DUI charge 
made. R. 41: p. 20, lines 12-12. 
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Three or four months later the Roosevelt city attorney's office decided to charge 
Wright with driving under the influence of alcohol and/or drugs. R. 41: p. 18, lines 5-7. 
Further, during cross-examination officer McKenna testified that there were no 
field sobriety tests nor any other physical tests performed on Wright. R. 41: p. 22, lines 
11-15. Blood was not drawn or tested. R. 41: p. 18 & 19. There were several officers 
present during this incident and according to officer McKenna he wanted to test Wright, 
but he was told not to by his superiors. R. 41: p. 18, lines 22-23. 
During cross-examination it was determined that officer McKenna had actually 
had two encounters with Wright. One encounter occurred in the morning (the incident 
described above) and a second incident that occurred in the afternoon at Wright's motel 
room. R. 41: p. 21. 
Officer McKenna testified his police report did not say anything about Wright 
taking medication during the morning incident. R. 41: p. 21. Further, officer McKenna 
could not remember whether it was during the morning incident or the afternoon incident 
that medication had been discussed. R. 41: p. 21. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Wright asserts that the trial court did not have sufficient evidence to convict him of 
Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol and/or Drugs. In the morning of October 10, 
2008, Wright was seized by police officers, while he was sitting in a vehicle in the 
parking lot in the Western Hills Motel. During this incident Wright had difficulty 
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walking and performing some functions. However, Wright was not asked to perform 
field sobriety tests. The police did not smell the odor of alcohol or any other drug. 
Wright was not requested to take any chemical tests, including blood tests. Although 
Officer McKenna wanted Wright to be given additional tests, his superiors disagreed, and 
Wright was released without being cited for DUL 
Officer McKenna testified that Wright told him that he had taken some 
medication. However, officer McKenna could not remember if he had been told about 
the medication during the morning incident or whether he was told about the medication 
during a second afternoon incident that had occurred with Wright. In any event, there 
was no testimony regarding what type of medication was allegedly taken. There was no 
testimony regarding when the medication had been taken, whether it was before the 
morning incident or whether it occurred later in the day before the second incident. 
ARGUMENT 
THERE WAS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO SUSTAIN A CONVICTION 
AGAINST DAVID KOLE WRIGHT FOR DRIVING UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF 
ALCOHOL AND/OR DRUGS. 
RULE 
"When reviewing a bench trial for sufficiency of evidence, we must sustain the 
trial court's judgment unless it is against the clear weight of the evidence, or if the 
appellate court otherwise reaches a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been 
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made." Spanish Fork v. Bryan. 1999 UT App 61, lj 5, 975 P.2d 501 (citations omitted). 
"In addition, '[a] guilty verdict is not legally valid if it is based solely on inferences that 
give rise to only remote or speculative possibilities of guilt."5 Id. "However, 'before we 
can uphold a conviction it must be supported by a quantum of evidence concerning each 
element of the crime as charged from which the fact finder may base its conclusion of 
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.'" State v. Larsen, 999 P.2d 1252 (Ut. App 2000). 
"Defendant 'must marshal all of the evidence in support of the trial court' findings 
of fact and then demonstrate that the evidence, including all reasonable inferences drawn 
therefrom, is insufficient to support the findings against an attack.'" Id. at % 11 (citing 
State v. Moosman. 794 P.2d 474, 475-76 (Utah 1990). 
ANALYSIS 
In order for Wright to prevail on his appeal he must first marshal all the evidence 
in favor of the state and then demonstrate that the evidence, including all reasonable 
inferences drawn from them are insufficient to find Wright guilty beyond a reasonable 
doubt. The evidence that Roosevelt City produced is as follows: 
1) "The driver, a male, in the driver's seat passed out, car running. He had a - - at 
some point had a lit cigarette in his mouth and it had burned out and had ashes all over his 
chest." R. 41: p. 7, lines 13-16. 
2) The driver was Wright. R. 41: p. 7 & 8. 
3) "He had had [sic] a lit cigarette that was in his lips, and he had slumped over to 
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the point the cigarette had burned out and was out at the filter." R. 41: p. 8, lines 9-12. 
4) "I began pounding on the windows trying to wake the individual. I went to the 
window he was at. I went to the passenger's window, back to this window, probably 15 
to 20 minutes trying to wake the individual. Pounding on the glasses and the side of the 
door trying to wake the individual." R. 41: p. 9, lines 15-21. 
5) "With the rod while trying to get in because he's right next to the window and 
door itself. He started to move a little bit, so I continued to prod him with the pole to try 
and wake him up. And he, after five minutes, did rouse with me hitting him with the 
pole." R.41:p. 10&11. 
6) "He was very disoriented, didn't know exactly where he was at. It took him a 
minute to even function to roll the window down." R. 41: p. 11, lines 4-6. 
7) "When he started to get out of the car. I actually physically had to grab him 
because he almost fell over . . . then I asked him to move to the back of the car, and I had 
to physically help him to the back of the car." R. 41: p. 12, lines 11-19. 
8) "He needed assistance in just about everything. When he had tried to grab his 
license I had to assist him in showing him which one is his license, because he kept going 
- - he had a rather large billfold, and he went through the billfold probably six times. And 
I had to help him find his license. While standing there we had to lean him up against the 
car so that he wouldn't fall over. Everything he did he struggled with due to his 
impairment." R. 41: p. 15, lines 11-20. 
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that he was in a condition where he could safely dri\ e a vehicle? 
A D A*.r 1 ^ H n e s 1-5. 
. detained 1 lii i I ii i a i t officer's cai w hile w e because he 
was actually - - couldn't stand up, he was snltitu? verbalb, ubiisn r nilli ni. \ <M> psM-dl .ill 
and getting disorderly, so we placed him in a car to calm him down." R. 4 i. p. J1, lines 
M- IS'1 
• rvrnil nuniilrs * »:• ^ . nk u a^ccrtau, »k iu^. uii-^ 
some medication. At that point, that's all 1 » *d mi ^ . 
"
T
 " -h.' was charged with Driving I inder the Inllucncc oi Alcohol and'or d r u ^ 
under I Huh 1 ode Ann. Section 41-6a-502. The relevant part of the section states as 
follow, "i I i \ ficiM(»ii III iv in I M|K'nile m In1 ftililal physical contr ol of a vehicle w ithin 
this state if the person. ^ v As under the influence of alcnln, .1 ,iin Juiy,. in Ibr < umluii I 
infl.uen.ee of alcohol and any drug to a degree that renders the person incapable of safely 
nperalinji «i vehicle 
B e f o r e t h i s COi 111 (Mill n n l i n M 11 n - 11 • -• I m i l s i mtivii I m p llii in, fit!!1*."! In; i in | • „ i» i I  11 in ixx o f 
evidence concerning each element of the crime as charged, i ipon which a conclusion < I 
£vni-i beyond a reasonable doubt may be based Spain »" '" y v, Bryan, 1999 UT 61, 
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Wright asserts that the State of Utah did not produce a quantum of evidence that he 
was under the influence of alcohol, any drug or the combined influence of alcohol or any 
drug to a degree that rendered him incapable of safely operating a vehicle. In summary, 
the City did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that any inability to operate the vehicle 
was caused by alcohol or drugs or a combination of the two. 
The term "quantum" is defined as a quantity or amount. Wright asserts that the 
trial court erred based on two reasons. First, Wright asserts that there is a dispute as to 
whether there is any credible testimony upon which the trial court could make a finding 
that Wright was on medication or alcohol at the time he was in physical control of the 
vehicle. Second, if there is credible testimony that he was on medication, there is no 
evidence that the medication had the ability to impair Wright. 
Was there any credible testimony or evidence regarding the use of alcohol or 
drugs? The City's only witness testified that there was "No. alcohol, no." R. 41: p. 22, 
line 18. "There was no marijuana, no." R. 41: p. 23, line 3. At one point in the officer's 
testimony, he testified that "[ajfter several minutes of talking with him I was able to 
ascertain he had taken some medication." R. 41: p. 13 & 14. However, during cross-
examination the officer recanted this statement. 
Officer McKenna had two encounters with Wright on October 10, 2008. The first 
encounter was in the morning, which is the subject matter of the present case. Wright had 
been found in his vehicle, at the time Wright was not tested for drugs or alcohol. Several 
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testing or without being cited for DM R i _. p. li), line- 12-15 & R. A i.
 r . ^ iUv. 
Officer McKenna further testified: 
lything in his system at the 
time of his incident? 
^ \UK. ume of this incident, no. No physical test. no. R. 41. p. 22. 
i u second incident that occurred on October 10, °008, was in the afternoon at a 
mold > 
I was a little unclear. But it wo:;ld '• .* v-**miM-' •. ; - i; 
this incident that you've testified to you didn't have any evidence that he taken any 
medical ion7 
- I *"" Mm illlii ir iormn;' nut idt iM - -
^. r^&ik. vJi at least there's nothing in the repoi I: for that incident th> v f-
hadbeen take b> him. 
-j •  ^ in the report: I 11 z call him saying things about taking 
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The officer then went on to explain that he had dealt with Wright both in the 
morning and in the afternoon, so he did not recall exactly when Wright had mentioned the 
ii'inlu alion. I lierefbre, there is no credible testimony or evidence that Wright was under 
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the influence of alcohol and/or drugs during the time that he was in physical control of the 
vehicle in the morning of October 10, 2010. 
Second, Wright asserts that even if the court determines that there is a quantum of 
evidence that Wright had taken medication during the morning incident, there is 
absolutely no evidence that the medication was of the type that would impair Wright. 
There was no blood tests taken. The only testimony on the subject supports Wright's 
position. Officer McKenna testified as follows: 
Q. Well, I mean something that might cause impairment. 
A. No. Most medication does not cause impairment, so I can't - - or doesn't smell, 
so I can't - R. 41: p. 22 & 23. 
Wright's argument at trial and on appeal is simple. There is not sufficient 
evidence to show that he was under the influence of alcohol or drugs. City did not bear 
its burden showing that Wright was on any type of alcohol or drug that could impair him. 
Wright also asserts that the trial court inappropriately placed the burden on the defendant 
to prove that the impairment was caused by something other than drugs. 
Wright's attorney argued that there were other conditions that could cause 
impairment and that the City did not prove that the impairment was caused by drugs. 
However, the trial court made the following statement: "So the question is, well, is this 
something that was caused by an illness. I don't have any information before the Court 
that he was ill, you know, to - - to say - - to a make a finding that he was ill would be 
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statement *hi he'd been taking medication. But that statement seems to explain his 
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Wught asseil1.111a 1 dial i mil . m «J ii. Ino ici^ii'iL lirst, the trial court ignored, the 
evidence indicating that Wright w as not in [paired b> di tigs oi alcol 10I I here w as 
evidence ihai other -ificcr- were present, that they had witnessed Wright's behavior and 
they did not belu \ ^  \\i* impairment was caused by drugs or alcohol. 
. -, i ••»uicers Vv ithyou? 
*±. x arrived first, but lucre were siM i ! • -i . '^.* r- », 
6, lines 17-20. 
"I went ami NpoKa u> ins girlfriend again while the other officer stayed with him." 
> 
Uilicer McKenna testified that his superiors told 
41: p, 18, lines 22-23. 
in this matter, there were other oi i icers present. In fact, they had more contact • 
with WiijLiltl (lieu il'lii u McKriinii uJulr nl'lirrr McKi'nn.i I\,IS Ulkmglo Wughfs 
girlfriend they were watching Wright. Based on "'the other officer's observ ation the> did 
not think he was under the influence any alcohol or drugs and told officer McKenna not 
I* F get A Mm H 11 Int vi I iased on their observations of Wright he was not issued a citation 
for DUI. Months later, the city attorney made a decision to prosecute Wright. R. 41: p. 
18. 
The second error Wright asserts that the trial court made was that instead of 
requiring the State of Utah to prove that Wright was impaired by drugs or alcohol beyond 
a reasonable double, it shifted the burden to Wright. Wright was required to show that his 
impairment was due to something other than drugs. 
The court in State v. Reyes, 116 P.3d 305, stated: 
No person accused in the United States may be convicted of a crime unless 
each element of the offense has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt. 
In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358. 362, 90 S. Ct. 1068. 25 L.Ed. 2d 368 (1970). 
The Supreme Court has assigned this standard of proof constitutional status, 
linking it to both the Fifth Amendment right to due process of law and the 
Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial. Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 
278, 113 S.Ct. 2078, 124 L.Ed. 2d 182 (1993); Winship, 397 U.S. at 362, 
364, 90 S.Ct.1068. The degree of certainty of guilt that we insist be held by 
those entrusted with judging the fate of persons charged with crimes before 
we will permit the State to wield its power to punish is not only a measure 
of evidence, but also in a more fundamental sense a gauge of our nation's 
conscience. The measure of certainty the law demands before finding guilt 
reflects the balance we are willing to strike between ensuring that all of the 
guilty are brought to justice and preventing the conviction and punishment 
of the innocent. Blackstone set an enduring benchmark for the measure of 
certainty required to convict in a civilized society when he stated that 'the law 
holds that it is better that ten guilty persons escape than that one innocent 
suffer.5 4 William Blackstones, Commentaries *27, quoted in Coffin v. 
United States. 156 U.S. 432, 456, 15 S.Ct. 394, 39 L.Ed. 481 (1895). 
State v. Reves, 2005 UT 33, If 11. 
The mere morsel of evidence that the State of Utah produced in this matter was 
stated by Judge Payne in his closing statements, " . . . all we have is the statement that he'd 
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contests the accuracy of this finding because the officer could i\< ? remember \\ 1 • > -< this 
referred to the morning incident or afternoon incident. In any event, this is not sufficient 
evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the medication caused Wright to be 
impair ed. 
CONCI.UMUN 
The City is required to prove every element beyond a reasonable doubt. It must 
prove that Wright was under the influence of alcohol, any drug, or the combined 
iiifli lei ice of alcol 10I ai id airiy cii i ig to a degi ee that renders the person incapabk < , ,a-. • 
operating a vehicle. I I: le contested statement ft: on 1 Offic •€ i 1\ lcKe i:i:iia < 
Wright was taking medication is not sufficient evidence to prove that Wright was under 
««k uiiiuciicc of a drug that rendered him incapable of safely operating a vehicle, 
{ i;
 '*' * ^
 v
 * i on be reversed. 
DATED Una 11 \lay u i MaiCJ 
JOEL D. BERRETT 
M A ^ \ W ^ UxJJ) 
Bryan Sidwell 
Attorney for A ppellant 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on March 11, 2010,1 served two copies of the foregoing Brief 
of Appellee's attorney Clark Allred, by causing them to be delivered by mail, postage 
prepaid as follows: 
Clark B. Allred 
72 North 300 East (123-14) 
Roosevelt, Utah 84066 
Bryan Sidwell 
Attorney for Appellant 
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ADDENDUM 
41-6a-502 Driving under the influence of alcohol, drugs, or a combination of both 
with specific or unsafe blood alcohol concentration. (2005) 
(1) A person may not operate or be actual physical control of a vehicle within this state 
if the person: 
(a) has sufficient alcohol in the person's body that a subsequent chemical test 
shows that the person has a blood or breath alcohol concentration of .08 grams 
or greater at the time of the test; 
(b) is under the influence of alcohol, an drug, or the combined influence of alcohol 
and any drug to a degree that renders the person incapable of safely operating a 
vehicle. 
c) has a blood or breath alcohol concentration of .08 grams or greater at the time of 
operation or actual physical control. 
(2) Alcohol concentration in the blood shall be based upon grams of alcohol per 100 
milliliters of blood, and alcohol concentration in the breath shall be based upon grams of 
alcohol per 210 liters of breath. 
(3) A violation of this section includes a violation under a local ordinance similar to this 
section adopted in compliance with Section 41-6a-510 
